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On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).1 Among other things, 
this complex 2700-page statute prohibits private health insurers from 
denying coverage based on pre-existing medical conditions, expands 
eligibility for Medicaid (which provides health care for indigents), 
provides incentives for employers to provide health care benefits, 
and supports medical research. It also imposes a financial penalty on 
those who do not obtain health insurance by 2014 –the so-called 
“individual mandate”– unless they are exempt because of low income. 
Its proponents claim that PPACA will significantly expand access to 
health care while simultaneously helping to curtail health-care costs 
by cuts in reimbursements to hospitals for medical services and by 
establishing “health insurance exchanges” that would enable indi-
viduals and small businesses to compare the costs and coverage of 
various insurance plans. But its opponents charge that PPACA will 
Article received 03/03/2011; approved 26/04/2011.
1. On Truman’s effort, see Monte M. Poen, Harry Truman versus the Medical Lobby (Co-
lumbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979). More generally, see James Morone and David 
Blumenthal, The Heart of Power: Health and Politics in the Oval Office (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 2009).11
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promote greater governmental control over health care, raising costs 
without enhancing the quality of care.
Beginning with President Harry Truman in the late 1940s, sev-
eral previous Democratic presidents had unsuccessfully championed 
health-care reform, so PPACA was a landmark enactment.2The Act 
sparked bitter partisan divisions in Congress and eventually was 
adopted on virtually a party-line vote. In the Senate, the legislation 
passed by a vote of 56-43, with no Republican voting in favor of 
it, and in the House of Representatives the margin was 219-212, 
again without a single Republican vote in favor. The Act remains 
politically controversial. During the 2010 congressional elections, 
Republican candidates made opposition to “ObamaCare” a center-
piece of their campaigns, and after the Republicans won control 
of the House of Representatives in that election, one of their first 
actions (on January 19, 2011) was to pass a bill repealing PPACA. 
This action was largely symbolic, as the bill stood no chance of 
passing in the Democratically-controlled Senate or of surviving a 
presidential veto. Nonetheless, the House’s action underscored the 
continuing Republican opposition to PPACA, and the Republicans 
plan to revise various features of the Act and to limit funding for 
its implementation.
The Act has raised constitutional as well as political contro-
versy. Under Section 1501 of the Act, most Americans who do not 
have health insurance are obliged to obtain coverage by 2014 or 
they will be subject to what the Act’s supporters call “a tax” but 
what its opponents call “a fine.” Supporters view this “individual 
mandate” provision as crucial to the Act’s goals of ensuring uni-
versal health coverage and reducing the costs of medical care. They 
insist that private insurers could not afford to provide coverage to 
persons with pre-existing medical problems, unless they could be 
guaranteed that all persons, including healthy ones, purchased in-
surance, thereby increasing the pool of funds available to them. 
Opponents not only doubt the efficacy of the individual mandate 
but also –and more importantly for present purposes– challenge 
2. P.L. 111-148 (2010). For an overview of the politics of its enactment, see Lawrence R. 
Jacobs and Theda Skcopol, “Hard Fought Legacy: Obama, Congressional Democrats, and 
Struggle for Comprehensive Health Reform,” available at: http://www.russellsage.org/sites/
all/files/u4/Obama_Chapter%202_Health%20Reform.pdf.12
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its constitutionality, insisting that it represents an unprecedented 
expansion of federal authority.3
Even before President Obama signed PPACA into law, the at-
torneys general of 12 states had filed suit in federal court, challenging 
the constitutionality of the individual mandate provision. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, all these attorneys general were Republicans and thus 
political opponents of the president. By early 2011, with the replace-
ment of Democratic by Republican attorneys general in several states, 
the number of states filing suit against the individual mandate had 
risen to 26.4 Other suits challenging the individual mandate were also 
commenced in federal courts, and by early 2011 two district court 
judges had ruled the mandate constitutional, while another three had 
invalidated it.5 This study examines the arguments for and against the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate, relates this litigation to 
United States Supreme Court rulings analyzing the scope of federal 
power, and speculates on the likely outcome when the Supreme Court 
considers constitutional challenges to the individual mandate. Before 
3. Opponents of the law have challenged the constitutionality of the law on a variety of 
other grounds, ranging from complaints that it violated the religion clause of the Bill of 
Rights to arguments that it exceeded the spending power of the federal government. 
Most of these claims were patently frivolous, and they were summarily rejected by 
the district courts. Hence, we shall focus exclusively on the constitutional challenge to the 
individual mandate.
4. Not all state officials have opposed the Act or questioned its constitutionality. See John 
Gramlich, “State legislative group lends backing to health care law,” Stateline, November 
17, 2010, at: http://stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=529645.
5. Rulings upholding the individual mandate include Liberty University v. Geithner, 2010 
WL 4860299 (W.D. Va. 2010); Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. 
Mich. 2010); and Wisconsin Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Brennan, Case No. 
09-cv-764-wmc (D.C. 2011), available at http://media.journalinteractive.com/documents/
WRTL_Decision_033111.pdf. The rulings striking down the individual mandate are Cucci-
nelli v. Sibelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010), and Florida v. U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, Case No.: 3-10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla. 2011). In Cuccinelli the district 
judge declined the plaintiff’s request to suspend implementation of the Act pending 
appeal, so the ruling had no immediate practical effect. In Florida the district judge decli-
ned to issue an injunction suspending implementation of the Act but opined that it was 
expected that federal authorities would act in line with his judgment. The rulings in all 
these cases have been appealed, and it is expected that the United States Supreme Court 
will ultimately resolve the constitutional issue.
Interestingly, the rulings upholding the individual mandate were issued by judges appo-
inted by Democratic presidents, while those striking it down were issued by judges appoint-
ed by Republican presidents. With this in mind, it is worth noting that as of early 2011, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has 5 justices appointed by Republican presidents.13
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doing so, however, it is useful to place the current dispute in historical 
and constitutional context.
1.  The Historical and Constitutional Context
1.1. Health Care in the United States
For most of the nation’s history, the American health care system 
relied on the private provision of services, with patients paying physi-
cians for their care directly. Throughout the nineteenth century and 
into the twentieth century, government initiatives were limited pri-
marily to public health, the construction of hospitals, and the provision 
of medical care for the indigent. State governments encouraged hos-
pital construction by giving money to institutions that providing char-
itable care. For example, by 1898, Pennsylvania had 113 benevolent 
or not-for-profit hospitals, of which 69 were aided by the state.”6 State 
governments also played the primary role in attempting to prevent 
the spread of communicable diseases, particularly in major cities where 
population density and inadequate sanitation aggravated health prob-
lems. Local governments provided services for those unable to afford 
medical care, although “early arrangements were made on an ad hoc, 
decentralized, local, and often erratic basis,” and most care was pro-
vided by private charity rather than by government.7 Congress in 1878 
passed a National Quarantine Act in order to prevent entry into the 
country of persons with communicable diseases, but generally the 
federal government played little role in health care until the twenti-
eth century.
This began to change after the ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment, which authorized the imposition of a federal income 
tax, in 1913. The imposition of an income tax increased the revenues 
available to the federal government, and this enabled it to provide 
grants to state governments to fund activities of interest to the fed-
eral government, including the provision of medical care. For example, 
the federal Maternity Act of 1921 provided for grants to states that 
6. Rosemary Stevens, The Public-Private Health Care State: Essays on the History of Ame-
rican Health Care Policy (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007), p. 10.
7. Ibid., p. 188.14
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agreed to establish programs designed to reduce maternal and infant 
mortality and protect the health of mothers and infants.8 Spurred 
partially by federal grants-in-aid but also by increasing needs, state 
governments also expanded their involvement in health care during 
the first half of the twentieth century. Another important develop-
ment during the twentieth century was the replacement of direct 
payment for services with a system of health insurance provided in 
part or in total by the employer. The federal government encouraged 
the development of these private, voluntary insurance plans, and a 
ruling by the Internal Revenue Service in 1951 that employers’costs 
for premiums were a tax-deductible expense made large-scale devel-
opment of private health insurance viable.9
Federal involvement in health care increased dramatically in the 
latter half of the twentieth century.10 In 1965, Congress enacted Med-
icaid, a cooperative program under which the federal and state gov-
ernments jointly provide health insurance for low-income persons. This 
program, which is administered by the states, has expanded so that 
even though the federal government provides more than half the 
8. A federal taxpayer sought to challenge the constitutionality of this program in Fro-
thingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923. However, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the 
suit, arguing that a federal taxpayer lacks standing to sue to challenge its constitutiona-
lity of appropriations, because the taxpayer cannot demonstrate “that he has sustained 
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, 
and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.” 
Although the Supreme Court has expanded slightly its understanding of “standing to sue” 
in ways that facilitate challenges to federal appropriations or spending –see e.g., Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)– the Court continues to look askance at taxpayer challenges, 
even when it is asserted that the federal government has exceeded its authority. See, e.g., 
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, 551 U.S. 587 (2001). 
9. “By mid-1958 nearly two-thirds of the population had some coverage for hospital costs, 
the most common type of insurance… [and] when the main earner was fully employed, 
the probability of having some insurance was 78 percent.” Paul Starr, The Social Transfor-
mation of American Medicine (NY: Basic Books, 1982), p. 334.
10. To illustrate this: from 1965, when Medicaid was enacted, to 2000, the percentage of 
all federal grants going to health policy rose from 6% to 43%. See Frank J. Thompson, 
“Federalism and Health Care Policy: Toward Redefinition?” in Robert B. Hackey and David 
A. Rochefort, eds., The New Politics of State Health Policy (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2001), p. 43. For overviews of federal initiatives and the history of health care in 
the United States more generally, see Kant Patel and Mark Rushefsky, Health Care Politics 
and Policy in America, 3rd ed. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2006), Chapter 2; Starr, Social 
Transformation of American Medicine; Theda Skocpol, Protecting Mothers and Soldiers: 
The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 
1992); and Stevens, The Public-Private Health Care State. 15
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funding, Medicaid payments currently account for 22 percent of state 
budgets.11 Congress in 1965 also enacted Medicare, which established 
a program of compulsory health insurance for the elderly, financed 
through payroll taxes (Medicare A) and a voluntary insurance program 
for physicians’ services subsidized through general revenues (Medicare 
B). In addition, Congress enacted a number of other health programs 
during the 1960s, such as Maternal and Infant Care, the Children Sup-
plemental Feeding Program, and community health centers as part of 
President Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Poverty.” In 2003 Congress en-
acted the Medicare Modernization Act, which established a new vol-
untary outpatient prescription drug benefit. Although these programs 
were controversial when they were enacted, the controversy focused 
on the wisdom and financial viability of the initiatives, not on their 
constitutionality. These federal programs now enjoy broad public sup-
port, and so although there may be efforts to reduce program costs, 
there is little likelihood of their elimination. Indeed, recent poll data 
reveal strong popular support for the federal government taking the 
lead in health-care policy.12 Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to de-
scribe this array of programs as a fully integrated health-care system.
11. This figure is drawn from “In State Budgets, Medicaid Goes under the Knife,” Kaiser 
Health News, December 22, 2010, available at: http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Daily-
Reports/2010/December/22/states.aspx. Other commentators dispute the figure, arguing 
that it is misleading because it includes federal funds given to the states as well as state 
funds. According to the Center for Children and Families at Georgetown University: “On 
average, federal funds account for 56.2 percent of all Medicaid spending. Average state 
spending on Medicaid as a share of state general fund budgets is actually 16.8 percent, 
and just 13.4 percent as a share of spending from all state funds.” See “Medicaid and 
State Budgets: Looking at the Facts,” at: http://ccf.georgetown.edu/index/cms-filesystem-
action?file=ccf%20publications/about%20medicaid/nasbo%20final%205-1-08.pdf.
Medicaid provides funds to private health-care providers in reimbursement for the medi-
cal care that they provide for indigents. Although Medicaid is jointly funded by the fede-
ral government and state governments, state governments bear primary responsibility for 
its implementation. The federal government establishes general guidelines that states 
must adhere to qualify for federal matching funds and grants. However, within those 
guidelines, states have considerable leeway in determining eligibility requirements, what 
services to provide, the level of reimbursements to hospitals and nursing homes, and many 
other matters. For overviews of how states have exercised the discretion available to them, 
see Robert F. Rich and William D. White, eds., Health Policy, Federalism, and the American 
States (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1996); Hackey and Rochefort, New Politics 
of State Health Policy; and John Holahan, Alan Weil, and Joshua M. Wiener, eds., Federa-
lism and Health Policy (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 2003).
12. See Saundra K. Schneider, William G. Jacoby, and Daniel C. Lewis, “Public Opinion 
Toward Intergovernmental Policy Responsibilities,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 41 
(Winter 2011): 13-15.16
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In closing this historical overview, it should be noted that the 
increased federal involvement in health care has not displaced the 
states. In part, this is because Medicaid was a joint federal-state pro-
gram, with states responsible for its administration and for a substan-
tial portion of the funding. In part, too, federal grants have encouraged 
state initiatives. Finally, the increasing cost of Medicaid, as well as 
federal budget gaps that curtailed federal policy innovation, has led 
states to assume a leadership role in the health care field in the late 
twentieth century.13 For example, both California and North Carolina 
introduced programs for increasing access to prenatal care for low-
income women in order to reduce infant mortality; South Carolina 
adopted a program to identify and provide services to women with 
high-risk pregnancies; and 20 states adopted “presumptive eligibility” 
programs so that pregnant women could receive care without going 
through the normal, but cumbersome and time-consuming process of 
proving Medicaid eligibility.14
1.2. Constitutional Fundamentals
The U.S. Constitution grants a limited legislative authority to the 
federal government. Article I, Section 1 grants Congress all “legislative 
powers herein granted,” thereby implying that there are legislative 
powers beyond those “herein granted.” James Madison stated his 
expectations on this in The Federalist No. 45:
The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the fed-
eral government are few and defined. Those which to remain in the 
State governments are numerous and indefinite. The powers reserved 
to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary 
course of affairs, concern the live, liberties, and properties of the peo-
ple, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
13. For an overview of state innovations, see Howard M. Leichter, “State Governments and 
Their Capacity for Health Care Reform,” and Michael S. Sparer and Lawrence D. Brown, 
“States and the Health Care Crisis: The Limits and Lessons of Laboratory Federalism,” both 
in Robert F. Rich and William D. White, eds., Health Policy, Federalism, and the American 
States (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1996).
14. These innovations are described in Saundra K. Schneider, “Improving the Quality of 
Maternal and Child Health Care in the United States: State-Level Initiatives and Leadership,” 
in Howard M. Leichter, ed., Health Policy Reform in America: Innovations from the States 
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992).17
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That the legislative powers of the federal government are lim-
ited is also confirmed by the drafters’ decision to enumerate those 
powers (Article 1, Section 8) rather than to grant Congress a plenary 
legislative authority. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution af-
firms the limited grant of authority to the federal government, declar-
ing that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.” Thus all residual powers rest with the 
states or with the people. Although it does not limit federal powers 
directly, the Tenth Amendment is relevant to the interpretation of 
those powers, making clear that any interpretation that leads to a 
plenary federal authority is erroneous. This is true because, as James 
Madison noted in The Federalist, No. 39, the Constitution “leaves to 
the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.” Neverthe-
less, within its sphere, federal law is supreme, superseding all state 
enactments including state statutes and state constitutional provisions. 
This is confirmed by the federal Supremacy Clause (Article VI, Section 
2) which states that “this Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof… shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land.”
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given its eighteenth century origins, the 
U.S. Constitution does not expressly address what level of government 
has authority over health matters or whether such authority is shared 
between the federal and state governments. The federal government 
has justified its involvement in health care based on three constitu-
tional grants of power: the Taxing and Spending Clause, the Commerce 
Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Article I, section 8, par-
agraph 1 grants Congress the power “to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts, and Excises [and] to pay the Debts and provide for the com-
mon Defense and general Welfare of the United States.” Thus, Con-
gress can establish grant programs dealing with public health because 
of its power to spend for the general welfare, and it can impose 
taxes to raise revenues to underwrite such programs because of its 
power to lay and collect taxes for the public welfare. Article I, section 
8, paragraph 3grants Congress the power “to regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.” Thus Congress can regulate the provision of health care and 
the operation of medical institutions, at least insofar as these involve 
commerce among the several states, and the provision of health care 
involves the sale of products and services, so it does have a commercial 18
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character. Finally, Article I, section 8, paragraph 18 grants Congress 
the power “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing powers,” namely, those powers 
listed in the previous enumeration of powers. And so Congress can 
exercise whatever other powers are necessary and proper to make 
effectual the power over public health granted to it by the preceding 
provisions.
Yet the question remains: what are those federal powers over 
health care, and how far do they extend? More specifically, do they 
encompass a power to require persons to purchase health insurance 
and penalize them should they fail to do so? Or to put it in more 
analytic terms, do the commerce clause and necessary and proper 
clause grant Congress a power to require persons to purchase a prod-
uct from a private company? And does the taxing clause authorize 
the imposition of a penalty on a person who fails to purchase a prod-
uct from a private company? To answer these questions, one must 
turn to the Supreme Court’s rulings interpreting these constitutional 
provisions.
2.  The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Federal 
Powers
2.1. The Commerce Clause
  Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 
provides the starting point for all subsequent interpretations of the 
Commerce Clause.15 Although the case was eventually decided on the 
basis of a conflict between federal and state law, Marshall used Gib-
bons to elaborate a broad interpretation of federal power, emphasiz-
ing the founders’ desire to remove state barriers to economic activity 
and create a national common market. He expansively defined com-
merce to include “the commercial intercourse between nations, and 
parts of nations, in all its branches.” Furthermore, insisting that Con-
gress can deal with all obstacles to the free flow of goods among the 
states, Marshall concluded that congressional power necessarily ex-
tends to “that commerce which concerns more states than one”–a 
15. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).19
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formulation that encompasses but is not limited to interstate com-
merce. Insofar as intrastate activities affect commerce “among the 
several states,” they too are subject to congressional regulation.
  This broad interpretation had little immediate effect, because 
for almost a century after the American Founding, Congress enacted 
little commercial legislation. However, the passage of the Interstate 
Commerce Act (1887) heralded a more active national role, and con-
flict over the scope of congressional power soon reached the Supreme 
Court. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court 
developed a more restrictive conception of the commerce power and 
periodically invalidated congressional legislation.16 Following the ad-
vent of the Great Depression in1929 and the election of President 
Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, this narrower understanding of the com-
merce power collided with innovative federal efforts (Roosevelt’s “New 
Deal”) to stimulate an economic recovery. From 1934 to 1936, the 
Court struck down 13 federal laws, including key elements of the New 
Deal, and the reasons given by the Court in its opinions presaged the 
invalidation of future New Deal measures. In response, after his land-
slide reelection in 1936, President Roosevelt proposed a plan to increase 
the membership of the Supreme Court from 9 to 15 justices. Although 
the measure was promoted as necessary to help the Court with its 
workload, in fact it was intended to give the president a chance to 
change the balance on the Court by appointing justices more sympa-
thetic to his New Deal legislation. Although this “court-packing” plan 
was never adopted by Congress, the Supreme Court capitulated, up-
holding the National Labor Relations Act in 1937 and thereby signal-
ing a new approach in its interpretation of the Commerce Clause. The 
retirement of justices unsympathetic to his agenda gave Roosevelt the 
opportunity to appoint justices who shared his constitutional views, 
solidifying support for an expansive interpretation of the national 
commerce power.17
16. See, for example, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Schecter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). For 
overviews of the Court’s jurisprudence during this era from diverse perspectives, see Barry 
Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), and Edward S. Corwin, Court over Constitution 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1938). 
17. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
By 1943 all nine justices of the Supreme Court were Roosevelt appointees.20
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After 1937 the Supreme Court overruled several recent decisions 
and upheld major New Deal legislation.18 Equally important, it made 
clear that it would defer to congressional judgments as to whether 
economic activities “affected more states than one” and were there-
fore subject to congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause. 
The scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause under 
this new understanding is illustrated by the Court’s decision in Wick-
ard v. Filburn (1942), which has become an important precedent in 
the litigation over the individual mandate.19 Wickard involved the 
constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which 
imposed limitations on the acreage that individual farmers could de-
vote to wheat production. Congress sought by this legislation to con-
trol the volume of wheat moving in interstate and foreign commerce, 
in order to avoid surpluses and shortages that might lead to abnor-
mally low or high wheat prices. Filburn exceeded his allotment under 
the Act by 12 acres, but he kept the excess wheat for use on his own 
farm rather than selling it. Hence the question in the case was wheth-
er the federal power to regulate goods for production for interstate 
commerce extended to a power to regulate production intended 
wholly for personal consumption that would not enter into commerce 
at all.
A unanimous Supreme Court answered that question in the af-
firmative. Speaking for the Court, Justice Robert Jackson noted that 
consumption of home-grown wheat would reduce the demand for 
wheat in the marketplace. Therefore, although Filburn did not market 
his excess production, it still had an effect on the demand for wheat. 
Moreover, even if the effect of Filburn’s action on the demand for 
wheat was by itself only “trivial”, that was “not enough to remove 
him from the scope of the federal regulation where, as here, his con-
tribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, 
was far from trivial.”20 Thus, Wickard apparently stands for two prop-
ositions: (1) Congress’s power to regulate commerce among the sev-
eral states extends to activities, themselves not commercial, if they 
nonetheless have substantial effects on economic activity; and (2) Con-
18. See, for example, Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939) and United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100 (1941).
19. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
20. 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).21
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gress may regulate an activity that has only a trivial effect on commerce 
among the several states if it is part of a class of activities that falls 
within the reach of federal power. This latter point was reaffirmed in 
Perez v. United States (1971), a case that involved federal regulation 
of purely local loan-sharking.21
Both of the propositions established in Wickard also figured 
prominently in the Supreme Court’s most recent important ruling un-
der the Commerce Clause, Gonzales v. Raich (2005), which is likewise 
pertinent to the constitutionality of the individual mandate. This case 
involved the constitutionality of a federal statute that forbade the 
possession, obtaining, or cultivating of marijuana for personal use, 
despite a California law that authorized physicians to prescribe mari-
juana for seriously ill residents of the state and allowed those persons 
to grow or purchase marijuana. Speaking for a six-member Court 
majority, Justice John Paul Stevens upheld the federal law, concluding 
that “‘the power to make all Laws which shall be necessary and prop-
er for carrying into Execution’ its authority to ‘regulate commerce 
with foreign nations, and among the several States’ includes the pow-
er to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance 
with California law.”22 Relying on Wickard and Perez, the Court argued 
that Congress has authority to regulate local matters that are part of 
a class of activities that have substantial effects on interstate com-
merce. As in Wickard, the fact that a product was grown for personal 
use was not decisive, as there was “an established, albeit illegal, in-
terstate market” for marijuana. Likewise as in Wickard, Congress could 
reasonably conclude that “leaving home-grown marijuana outside 
federal control would similarly affect price and market conditions.”23 
Finally, again as in Wickard, the fact that Raich’s production of mari-
juana was trivial was irrelevant, as long as the class of production 
regulated was not. And ultimately, the Court reasoned, this determi-
nation was Congress’s to make: the Court observed that “we need not 
determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, 
substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a 
‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”24 If a rational basis existed 
21. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
22. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 1 (2005).
23. 545 U.S. 1, 19.
24. 545 U.S. 1, 22.22
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for concluding that the aggregate effect of personal growth and con-
sumption of marijuana for medicinal purposes under California law 
had a sufficient impact on interstate commerce to warrant regulation 
under the Commerce Clause, then the Court should defer to the judg-
ment of Congress on the matter and uphold the legislation.
The Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of the national 
commerce power after 1937 meant that from that year until 1995 only 
once, in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976) did the Supreme 
Court rule that an enactment exceeded Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause; and it expressly overruled that decision 9 years 
later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985).25 
However, in two recent cases, United States v. Lopez (1995) and Unit-
ed States v. Morrison (2000), the justices have acknowledged limits on 
Congress’s commerce power and struck down congressional enact-
ments.26 In Lopez a five-member Court majority struck down the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal offense to 
possess a firearm in a local school zone. Speaking for the Court, Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist noted that “even [our] modern-day prece-
dents which have expanded congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer limits.”27 Distinguish-
ing Wickard, the Court noted that the law in Lopez did not deal with 
economic activity and that weapons possession was only tenuously 
related to commerce among the several states. To accept such a con-
nection as justifying congressional regulation, the majority noted, 
would in effect leave the Court “hard pressed to posit any activity by 
an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.”28 This would 
undermine the constitutional architecture of the American federal 
system by converting the Commerce Clause into an unlimited grant 
of power.
  The same five-justice majority applied similar reasoning in 
United States v. Morrison, concluding that neither the Commerce 
25. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and Garcia v. San Antonio Me-
tropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
26. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000).
27. 514 U.S. 549, 556-557.
28. 514 U.S. 549, 564. 23
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Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to 
enact a provision of the Violence Against Women Act that gave victims 
a right to sue perpetrators of gender-based violence in federal court. 
Noting that gender-based violence is not economic activity, the Court 
observed that its past decisions had sustained congressional regulation 
of intrastate activity based on its effects on interstate commerce only 
when the activity in question itself had some sort of economic char-
acter. Maintaining this distinction was essential, the Court argued, 
because otherwise there would in practice be no limits to the federal 
commerce power. And this would be inconsistent with the constitu-
tional division of power between nation and state.
Thus, the Court sought to interpret the Commerce Clause in light 
of its understanding of the overall character of the constitutional system.
2.2. The Taxing Clause
  The Constitution grants the federal government broad taxing 
authority, subject to only three express limitations: Congress may not 
tax exports, it must apportion direct taxes among the states in relation 
to their population, and it must impose taxes uniformly throughout 
the country.29 None of these currently pose any problems, although 
it was necessary to amend the Constitution to overrule a Supreme 
Court decision that used the limitation on direct taxes to strike down 
a federal income tax.30 What has proved controversial are the uses to 
which Congress has put its taxing power. All taxes, in addition to rais-
ing revenue, make goods more expensive and thereby discourage 
their purchase, so taxes serve regulatory purposes as well. Thus the 
question becomes whether Congress, by using its taxing power for 
regulatory purposes, can legitimately reach activities that it could not 
regulate directly under its other enumerated powers.
During the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court held that 
if Congress could not regulate an activity directly, then it could not 
regulate it indirectly through the subterfuge of a “so-called tax.” 
29. These restrictions on the federal taxing power are found in Article I, section 8, paragra-
ph 1, and in Article I, section 9, paragraphs 4 and 5.
30. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 
(1895), was overturned with the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.24
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However, since 1937 the Court has taken the position that the power 
to tax, like the power to regulate commerce among the several states, 
is plenary.31 Hence it has refused to monitor the motives underlying 
congressional tax laws. As long as taxes produce some revenue, their 
regulatory purposes are irrelevant to their constitutionality. Because 
the assessment for failing to purchase health insurance does raise 
revenue, proponents have sought to characterize it as a tax, which 
would ensure its constitutionality, while opponents have disputed that 
characterization.
2.3. The Necessary and Proper Clause
Chief Justice John Marshall provided the authoritative interpre-
tation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland 
(1819), in which the Supreme Court recognized Congress’s power to 
charter the Bank of the United States and invalidated a Maryland tax 
on that bank.32 According to Marshall, the Constitution grants powers 
so that the federal government can achieve certain broad objectives. 
How best to achieve those objectives depends on circumstances, and 
so the Constitution’s framers did not specify in detail the means for 
accomplishing its aims. Instead, they included the Necessary and Prop-
er Clause to ensure Congress discretion in its choice of means. Marshall 
thus concluded: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope 
of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist 
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”33 This 
understanding continues to inform the Court’s jurisprudence. As the 
Court explained in United States v. Comstock (2010), “the Necessary 
and Proper Clause makes clear that the Constitution’s grants of spe-
cific federal legislative authority are accompanied by broad power to 
enact laws that are ‘convenient or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the author-
ity’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”34
31. See, for example, Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939), and United States v. Kahriger, 
345 U.S. 22 (1953).
32. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
33. 17 U.S. 316, 421.
34. United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010). See also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1, 22 (2005), and Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004).25
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This broad discretion in the choice of means might threaten to 
convert the federal government from a limited to an unlimited gov-
ernment. However, the Supreme Court in recent years has sought to 
avoid this by emphasizing that the constitutional principle of state 
sovereignty operates as a check. Thus, as Justice Antonin Scalia noted 
in Printz v. United States (1997), a law may serve the purpose of car-
rying into execution the Commerce Clause, but if it “violates the prin-
ciple of state sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provi-
sions we mentioned earlier, it is not a ‘Law… proper for carrying into 
Execution the Commerce Clause’” and so is unconstitutional.35 In oth-
er words, when the federal government claims that an exercise of 
power is authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Court 
must inquire not only whether the exercise of power serves to effec-
tuate an enumerated congressional power but also whether it prop-
erly respects the division of authority under the American federal 
system.
3.  Litigating the Constitutionality of the Individual 
Mandate
3.1. Congressional Power under the Commerce Clause and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause
  Three district courts have upheld the individual mandate as a 
valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce and Nec-
essary and Proper Clauses, but two others have concluded that the 
individual mandate exceeds congressional authority under those claus-
es. These conflicting outcomes reflect differing characterizations of 
the individual mandate, as well as differing readings of the Supreme 
Court’s recent rulings on the Commerce Power.
  The district courts that struck down the individual mandate 
described it as an unprecedented exercise of congressional power. 
According to these courts, PPACA was the first law in which Congress 
had mandated that someone buy a product from a private vendor. 
The courts further maintained that Congress had never before penal-
35. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997). See also New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992).26
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ized mere inactivity, a failure to take action, under the Commerce 
Clause. The courts read the Supreme Court’s rulings in United States 
v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison as establishing the proposition 
that Congress did not have the power to regulate all local non-com-
mercial activities that bore some attenuated relationship to commerce 
among the several states. Yet if this is true for non-commercial activ-
ity, it necessarily follows that it is true as well for non-activity, for the 
failure to participate in commerce among the states. In order to be 
subject to congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause, the 
courts asserted, a person had to engage in some “self-initiated action.” 
But persons who do not purchase health insurance engage in no ac-
tion at all; they simply choose not to participate in the health care 
market. And if their “decision not to purchase health insurance at a 
particular point in time does not constitute the type of economic 
activity subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause,” the Cuc-
cinelli court noted, “then logically an attempt to enforce such a pro-
vision under the Necessary and Proper Clause is equally offensive to 
the Constitution.” In addition, if Congress cannot coerce a person into 
engaging in an involuntary commercial action, then it cannot penal-
ize that person’s failure to do so.
  In making this argument, the courts distinguished the current 
case from the Supreme Court’s earlier rulings in Wickard v. Filburn, 
Perez v. United States, and Gonzales v. Raich, in which the justices had 
upheld congressional statutes under the Commerce Clause. In Perez, 
the courts noted, the Supreme Court had stressed that although loan 
sharking was illegal, it was nonetheless an “activity” with substantial 
economic effects on commerce among the states. Indeed, Justice Doug-
las’s opinion for the Court in Perez stated that loan sharking was the 
second largest source for revenue for organized crime.36 In Wickard 
and Gonzales, the courts continued, the litigants had made conscious 
decisions to engage in activities –growing wheat or cultivating mari-
juana– and that these activities affected markets for those products, 
so the litigants had voluntarily placed themselves within the stream 
of interstate commerce. According to the courts, however, these cas-
es staked out the outer boundaries of the Commerce Clause. But those 
who fail to purchase health insurance engage in no action, and they 
do not place themselves within the stream of interstate commerce. 
36. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155 (1971).27
REAF, núm. 14, octubre 2011, p. 10-35
Federalism and Health Care in the United States
As a result, the individual mandate represents a congressional exercise 
of power unsupported by earlier precedents and “beyond the his-
torical reach of the Commerce Clause.” Moreover, as the Florida court 
argued, upholding the individual mandate would convert the federal 
commerce power into an unlimited grant of authority:
The problem with this legal rationale, however, is that it would 
essentially have unlimited application. There is quite literally no 
decision that, in the natural course of events, does not have an 
economic impact of some sort. The decisions of whether and 
when (or not) to buy a house, a car, a television, a dinner, or 
even a morning cup of coffee also have a financial impact that 
–when aggregated with similar economic decisions– affect the 
price of that particular product or service and have a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce. To be sure, it is not difficult to 
identify an economic decision that has a cumulatively substantial 
effect on interstate commerce; rather, the difficult task is to find 
an economic decision that does not.37
Thus, in order to limit federal power and safeguard both state 
power and individual liberty, the two courts concluded that that “the 
law’s requirement that most Americans obtain insurance exceeded 
the regulatory authority granted to Congress under the Commerce 
Clause.” 
The other three district courts that addressed the constitutional-
ity of the individual mandate viewed the situation quite differently. 
First of all, they rejected the notion that the individual-mandate pro-
vision regulates “inactivity.” Those who choose not to purchase insur-
ance may be making an economic decision to try to pay for health 
care services later, out of pocket, rather than now through the pur-
chase of insurance. Alternatively, they may be making a decision to 
participate at some later point in time or they may expect that their 
health-care needs will be met by government or health-care providers, 
if they are unable to shoulder the costs. Whatever the economic cal-
culus, those who purchase health insurance and those who fail to do 
so are both making choices among alternatives; and because these 
economic decisions have practical consequences, just like economic 
37. Florida v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, at 53.28
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activities, they can be regulated by Congress if they have a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce. Thus, the Commerce Clause covers 
“economic decisions” as well as “economic activity.”
In determining whether individual decisions to purchase or not 
purchase health insurance have a sufficient effect on interstate com-
merce to justify congressional regulation, the two district courts have 
relied on Wickard and Raich, which recognized congressional author-
ity to regulate local matters that have substantial economic effects, 
even when the regulated individuals claim not to be participating in 
interstate commerce. Moreover, the fact that a single decision or ac-
tion has a trivial effect on interstate commerce is irrelevant, as long 
as the class of which it is an instance has a non-trivial effect. The courts 
therefore concluded that the sum of individual decisions to participate 
or not participate in the health insurance market has a critical collec-
tive effect on interstate commerce. They also noted that the indi-
vidual mandate was necessary to guarantee success of larger health 
care scheme, because without full market participation, the financial 
foundation supporting the health care system would fail. Thus, even 
if the individual mandate did not address “commerce” directly, it was 
necessary for implementing health-care reform and thus constitu-
tional under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
What, then, are the legal bases for the disagreement among the 
courts? Those judges who have upheld the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate have emphasized that it is consistent with recent 
Supreme Court precedent and that it is necessary for the success of 
the health-care reform. In so doing, they have assumed that if the 
Constitution authorizes the federal government to pursue an objec-
tive, it must also grant the federal government the means necessary 
to achieve that objective. In contrast, those judges who have struck 
down the individual mandate have emphasized a structural concern, 
namely, that the Constitution was designed to create a federal bal-
ance. Therefore, any interpretation of congressional power that de-
stroys that federal balance must be erroneous.
3.2. The Taxing Power
The key taxing-power issue raised by PPACA is whether the as-
sessment it imposes on those who fail to purchase insurance coverage 29
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is a “tax” or a “penalty” or “fine.” If the assessment is a tax, then the 
Constitution merely requires that it be for the “general welfare,” and 
hence the assessment would be constitutional. For Congress may use 
its power under the tax clause even for purposes that would exceed 
its power under other provisions of Article I.38 But if the assessment is 
a penalty or fine, then it must be justified as necessary and proper to 
the execution of an enumerated power. Under this understanding, 
the Tax Clause does not come into play at all. If Congress lacks the 
authority to require an individual to participate in the health-care 
market, it also lacks the authority to impose a penalty for failure to 
do so. Conversely, if Congress has the power under the Commerce 
Clause to require participation in the health-care market, then it has 
the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to impose a fine 
for failure to do so.39
Having concluded that Congress had the power under the Com-
merce Clause to impose the individual mandate, the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan did not address whether the assess-
ment was a tax or a penalty. However, the other two district courts 
did address the issue, and both concluded that it was a penalty. Both 
courts acknowledged that the fact that that the assessment served a 
regulatory purpose was irrelevant to its constitutionality, observing 
that all taxes have regulatory effects and that the Supreme Court had 
abandoned the distinction between revenue-raising and regulatory 
taxes. But looking closely at the text of the statute, they noted that 
PPACA itself called the exaction imposed for violation of the indi-
vidual coverage provision a “penalty,” whereas it described other 
provisions in PPACA as “taxes.” Although the penalty provision was 
subsequently placed in the section of the tax code entitled “Miscel-
laneous Excise Taxes,” the courts pointed out that the tax code itself 
instructed that no inferences for statutory interpretation should be 
drawn from such placement. Finally, the very nature of the exaction, 
the fact that it encourages compliance with the Act by imposing a 
38. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950).
39. There is a related statutory issue as well. The Anti-Injunction Act states that “no suit 
for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained 
in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such 
tax was assessed.” (26 U.S.C.sec. 7421(a)). Thus the conclusion that the assessment was a 
tax would deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear the constitutional challenge to PPACA. 
Since this is not pertinent to federalism concerns, we do not analyze this issue in depth.30
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punitive expense on conduct that offends the Act, supported the con-
clusion that it is a penalty, not a tax. Thus, the penalty had to be 
justified as necessary and proper to the exercise of congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause.
3.3. Severability
When a provision in a statute is declared unconstitutional, this 
raises questions about the continuing validity of the surviving parts 
of the statute. Should these continue to operate, or should the entire 
statute be invalidated because the legislature intended to pass all 
of the law or none of it? This is the issue of the “severability” or 
“non-severability” of statutory provisions. If the legislature includes 
in the statute itself language indicating that one or more provisions 
are severable, that is, that their invalidation should not prevent the 
enforcement of the rest of the statute, that determination is usu-
ally binding on the court.40 This makes sense if the key concern in 
deciding on severability is whether the aims of the legislature can 
be achieved absent a particular provision, because the legislature is 
typically the best judge of that. But if the legislature does not spec-
ify in a statute what provisions (if any) are severable, then a court 
must use its best judgment in resolving the matter. It can look to the 
legislative history of the statute, statements of key supporters, or 
the reports of congressional committees. It may also consider wheth-
er Congress considered but rejected proposals to make provisions 
severable. Or courts may consider “whether, when the invalid provi-
sion is stricken, the remainder is complete in itself and capable of 
standing alone or being enforced consistent with the apparent leg-
islative intent.”41
40. This is not always the case. Courts tend to view legislative statements as to severabili-
ty as rules of construction rather than as inexorable commands. See John Copeland Nagle, 
“Severability,” North Carolina Law Review 72 (1993): 212-13. For an example of a court 
refusing to honor a legislative statement of non-severability, see Stilp v. Commonwealth, 
905 A.2d 918 (Pa. 2006). 
41. Otto J. Hetzel, Michael E. Libonati, and Robert F. Williams, Legislative Law and Statu-
tory Interpretation: Cases and Materials, 4th ed. (Newqrk, NJ: LexisNexis, 2008), p. 692. See, 
for example, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a single provision of an enactment but upheld 
the rest of the statute, noting that what remained was “fully operative as law.”31
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The health care law enacted by Congress did not include lan-
guage as to the severability of the individual mandate. The Obama 
administration has suggested that were the individual mandate to be 
invalidated, the Act’s provisions preventing insurance companies from 
discriminating against persons with pre-existing conditions would also 
be invalidated because they are inseparably linked. However, it has 
insisted that this would not necessitate the invalidation of the entire 
Act, noting that courts have a constitutional obligation to preserve 
as much of a statute as possible.42 Some commentators unsympathet-
ic to PPACA have challenged this latter conclusion, arguing that judg-
es should not assume that provisions are severable in the absence of 
an expression of clear congressional intent on the matter.43 Those 
district courts that upheld the individual mandate of course did not 
need to address the issue of severability. The district court in Cuc-
cinelli that struck down the individual mandate nonetheless upheld 
the constitutionality of the overall law. But the district court in Flori-
da reached the opposite conclusion. Although acknowledging that 
certain elements of PPACA could function independently, the court 
argued that “the individual mandate is indisputably necessary to the 
Act’s insurance market reforms, which are, in turn, indisputably neces-
sary to the purpose of the Act.”44 However, because there might be 
other ways to incentivize a healthy insurance pool through the tax 
code that could pass constitutional muster, one may doubt that ap-
pellate courts would strike down PPACA in its totality rather than 
affording Congress a chance to remedy any constitutional defects.
4.  Conclusion
The rulings of the district courts are not, of course, the last 
word on the constitutionality of the individual mandate. Their rul-
42. The White House’s position is discussed in Randy Barnett, “White House Concedes 
Individual Mandate Is Not Severable,” at: http://volokh.com/2010/12/09/white-house-con-
cedes-individual-mandate-is-not-severable/.
43. See Joshua Gordon, “From a Budgetary Perspective, the Health Care Individual Man-
date Is Not Severable,” at; http://www.concordcoalition.org/tabulation/budgetary-pers-
pective-health-care-individual-mandate-not-severable, and Maureen Martin, “Why Judge 
Hudson Was Wrong on Severability of the Individual Mandate,” at: http://www.heartland.
org/healthpolicy-news.org/article/29048/Why_Judge_Hudson_Was_Wrong_on_Severabili-
ty_of_the_Individual_Mandate.html. 
44. Florida v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, at 73.32
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ings have been appealed to the pertinent federal courts of appeals, 
which will also rule on the constitutionality of the individual mandate 
and on severability, and it is a foregone conclusion that the dispute 
will wind up before the U.S. Supreme Court. Prediction is always dan-
gerous, but it would be highly unusual for the Supreme Court to strike 
down the centerpiece of the political agenda of a president and his 
party, so I would expect that a divided Court will uphold the consti-
tutionality of the individual mandate. However, should the Supreme 
Court strike down the individual mandate, there might be constitu-
tionally unexceptionable substitutes available.
Among these possibilities is replacing the individual mandate 
with a system that permits consumers to buy insurance with no 
limits on preexisting conditions, but only when they first start a job 
or first become eligible to buy coverage. Those who fail to purchase 
at these points would be able to obtain coverage later on, but they 
would not be covered for any pre-existing condition for two years. 
Alternatively, it has been suggested that higher premiums to those 
who wait to enroll, much as Medicare does today. A third sugges-
tion is to create a very limited “open season” each year during 
which people could enroll. If they failed to sign up in that narrow 
window, they would have no coverage until the next enrollment 
period.45
  Yet even if these substitutes do not raise constitutional issues, 
that does not mean that they are politically feasible. In the 2010 
congressional elections, the Republicans gained control of the House 
of Representatives and reduced considerably the Democratic major-
ity in the Senate. Republican candidates ran in opposition to Presi-
dent Obama’s health care plan, with many pledging to seek its repeal. 
Although repeal is impossible, given Democratic control of the Sen-
ate and the presidency, Republicans will not support new legislation 
designed to effectuate the Democratic health care plan. Indeed, 
they can be expected to use their control over appropriations to 
45. Several alternatives are identified in Howard Gleckman, “Are There Alternatives to 
the Individual Mandate in the Health Reform Law?” at: http://taxvox.taxpolicycenter.
org/2011/01/18/are-there-alternatives-to-the-individual-mandate-in-the-health-reform-
law/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+taxpolicyc
enter%2Fblogfeed+%28TaxVox%3A+the+Tax+Policy+Center+blog%29&utm_
content=Google+Reader. This article also identifies sources where alternatives to the in-
dividual mandate are discussed at length.33
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undermine the program by starving implementation efforts. Indeed, 
one can expect such efforts to undermine the program regardless 
of how the Supreme Court rules. And should the Supreme Court 
strike down the individual mandate and rule that it is not severable, 
the Republicans will certainly not support reenactment of a slight-
ly modified PPACA.
  It is important to recognize that this Republican opposition 
rests not on federalism concerns but on disagreements with expand-
ed governmental involvement in the health care field, sometimes de-
nounced as “socialism.” In addition, opponents of Obamacare share 
a concern about how the individual mandate affects individual lib-
erty. If the federal government can tell citizens that they must spend 
their money on health insurance, it is argued, then the government 
can in principle tell them how they shall spend the rest of their mon-
ey as well. Thus, while constitutional objections in the United States 
may be framed in terms of federalism, principled political support for 
federalism is no longer a feature of American policies –if it ever was. 
There is a principled concern about the threat posed by concentrated 
political power, but the solution is sought in reducing the size and 
reach of government, not in dividing political power between fed-
eral and state governments.34
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ABSTRACT
President Barack Obama proposed a major overhaul of the American health 
system, and in 2010 the U.S. Congress enacted his proposal, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. Opponents of the Act challenged its 
constitutionality in federal court, claiming that it exceeds the powers gran-
ted to the federal government under the Commerce Clause and the Neces-
sary Proper Clause of the federal Constitution. Some courts have upheld 
the law, but others have agreed with the critics, in particular ruling that 
the provision requiring citizens to buy health insurance is unconstitutional. 
Eventually the U.S. Supreme Court will rule on the issue. This article traces 
the controversy, surveys the interpretation of pertinent constitutional pro-
visions in past cases, analyzes the constitutional arguments presented by 
proponents and opponents of the Act, and concludes that the Act is cons-
titutional.
Key words: Health care; commerce clause; U.S. Constitution; judicial review; 
individual mandate.
RESUM
L’any 2010 el Congrès dels EUA va promulgar la Llei de protecció del pacient 
i d’assistència sanitària assequible, d’acord amb la proposta presentada pel 
president Barack Obama per tal de revisar, a gran escala, el sistema de salut 
americà. Els contraris a la Llei n’han qüestionat la constitucionalitat davant 
el Tribunal Federal al·legant que excedeix les competències que la Clàusula 
de comerç i la Cláusula necessària i justa de la Constitució federal atorguen 
al Govern federal. Alguns tribunals han defensat la Llei, però d’altres han 
donat suport a les opinions dels crítics i han determinat que la disposició 
que exigeix que els ciutadans han de subscriure una assegurança mèdica és 
inconstitucional. Per tant, en última instància, serà el Tribunal Suprem dels 
EUA qui decidirà sobre el tema. Aquest article fa un seguiment de la con-
trovèrsia, examina la interpretació de les disposicions constitucionals perti-
nents en casos anteriors, analitza els arguments constitucionals que presen-
ten defensors i detractors de la Llei, i conclou considerant que aquesta és 
constitucional.
Paraules clau: assistència sanitària; clàusula de comerç; Constitució dels EUA; 
revisió judicial; mandat individual.35
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RESUMEN
En el año 2010 el Congreso de los EE.UU. promulgó la Ley de protección del 
paciente y de asistencia sanitaria asequible, de acuerdo con la propuesta 
presentada por el presidente Barack Obama a fin de revisar, a gran escala, 
el sistema de salud americano. Los contrarios a la Ley cuestionaron su cons-
titucionalidad ante el Tribunal federal alegando que excedía las competencias 
que la Cláusula de comercio y la Cláusula necesaria y justa de la Constitución 
federal otorgan al Gobierno federal. Algunos tribunales han defendido la 
Ley, pero otros han apoyado las opiniones de los críticos y han determinado 
que la disposición que exige que los ciudadanos han de suscribir un seguro 
médico es anticonstitucional. Por lo tanto, en última instancia, será el Tribu-
nal Supremo de los EE.UU. quien decidirá sobre el asunto. Este artículo hace 
un seguimiento de la controversia, examina la interpretación de las disposi-
ciones constitucionales pertinentes en casos anteriores, analiza los argumen-
tos constitucionales presentados por defensores y detractores de la Ley, y 
concluye considerando que ésta es constitucional.
Palabras clave: asistencia sanitaria; cláusula de comercio; Constitución de los 
EE.UU.; revisión judicial; mandato individual.